Arbeitspapier
Social Trust and Central-Bank Independence
Central banks have been made more independent in many countries. A common rationale has been the existence of a credibility (or lack-of-trust) problem for monetary policy. This indicates a possible and until now unexplored link between social trust and central-bank independence. Our empirical findings, based on data from 149 countries, confirm that there is such a link, in the form of a u-shaped relationship. We suggest that two factors help explain this finding: the need for this kind of reform and the ability with which it can be implemented. At low trust levels, the need for central-bank independence is strong enough to dominate the low ability; at high trust levels the ability for reform is high and dominates the low need; at intermediate trust levels there is neither need nor ability strong enough to generate very independent central banks.
- Language
-
Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
-
Series: IFN Working Paper ; No. 920
- Classification
-
Wirtschaft
Monetary Policy
Central Banks and Their Policies
Other Economic Systems: Political Economy; Legal Institutions; Property Rights; Natural Resources; Energy; Environment; Regional Studies
Economic Sociology; Economic Anthropology; Language; Social and Economic Stratification
- Subject
-
Trust
Credibility
Reforms
Monetary Policy
Inflation
Central Bank
Time Inconsistency
Vertrauen
Glaubwürdigkeit
Geldpolitik
Zentralbankunabhängigkeit
Regression
Welt
- Event
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
-
Berggren, Niclas
Daunfeldt, Sven-Olof
Hellström, Jörgen
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
-
Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN)
- (where)
-
Stockholm
- (when)
-
2012
- Handle
- Last update
-
20.09.2024, 8:24 AM CEST
Data provider
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Berggren, Niclas
- Daunfeldt, Sven-Olof
- Hellström, Jörgen
- Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN)
Time of origin
- 2012
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Editorial independence in an automated media system
Central Bank Credibility, Independence, and Monetary Policy
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