Arbeitspapier

Central bank independence and systemic risk

We investigate the relationship of central bank independence and banks' systemic risk measures. Our results support the case for central bank independence, revealing that central bank independence has a robust, negative, and significant impact on the contribution and exposure of a bank to systemic risk. Moreover, the impact of central bank independence is similar for the stand-alone risk of individual banks. Secondarily, we study how the central bank independence affects the impact of selected country and banking system indicators on these systemic measures. The results show that central bank independence may exacerbate the effect of a crisis on the contribution of banks to systemic risk. However, central bank independence seems to mitigate the harmful effect of a bank's high market power on its systemic risk contribution.

Sprache
Englisch
ISBN
978-952-323-333-1

Erschienen in
Series: BOFIT Discussion Papers ; No. 13/2020

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Banks; Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
Central Banks and Their Policies
Financial Institutions and Services: Government Policy and Regulation
Thema
systemic risk
central bank independence
supervisory framework

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Andrieș, Alin Marius
Podpiera, Anca Maria
Sprincean, Nicu
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Bank of Finland, Institute for Economies in Transition (BOFIT)
(wo)
Helsinki
(wann)
2020

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
20.09.2024, 08:22 MESZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Andrieș, Alin Marius
  • Podpiera, Anca Maria
  • Sprincean, Nicu
  • Bank of Finland, Institute for Economies in Transition (BOFIT)

Entstanden

  • 2020

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