Arbeitspapier

Complex ownership and capital structure

This paper investigates the impact of pyramid ownership structure and multiple controlling shareholders on firm leverage. Pyramids, having at least one controlling shareholder and a subsidiary, rely significantly more on debt financing than non-pyramid firms. Moreover, higher leverage is observed in pyramids where the second controlling shareholders have more voting rights. We also find that the disparity between the voting rights of the first two controlling shareholders is negatively related to firm leverage. Interestingly, the influence of the second controlling shareholder is only present in non-family controlled pyramids. Overall, the results are consistent with the view that controlling shareholders in pyramids use debt to secure their private benefits.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: Bank of Canada Working Paper ; No. 2009-12

Classification
Wirtschaft
Capital Budgeting; Fixed Investment and Inventory Studies; Capacity
Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
Subject
Financial markets
International topics
Unternehmensfinanzierung
Corporate Governance
Eigentümerstruktur
Familienunternehmen
Fremdkapital
G-7-Staaten

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Paligorova, Teodora
Xu, Zhaoxia
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Bank of Canada
(where)
Ottawa
(when)
2009

DOI
doi:10.34989/swp-2009-12
Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Paligorova, Teodora
  • Xu, Zhaoxia
  • Bank of Canada

Time of origin

  • 2009

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