Arbeitspapier

Capital structure, pay structure and job termination

We develop a model to analyze the link between financial leverage, worker pay structure and the risk of job termination. Contrary to the conventional view, we show that even in the absence of any agency problem among workers, variable pay can be optimal despite workers being risk averse and firms risk neutral. We find that firms employing workers with safer projects (and lower probability of job termination) use more variable compensation, and that leverage is strictly increasing in the amount of variable pay. These two results lead to the main insight of the paper: the more likely it is that a worker is terminated, the lower a firm's leverage. We provide empirical support for these predictions with a novel data set of all Canadian financial brokers and dealers. In the context of our empirical analysis, the model provides a novel mechanism to help explain why high leverage and high amounts of variable pay may be pervasive in financial relative to non-financial institutions.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Bank of Canada Staff Working Paper ; No. 2016-12

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Investment Banking; Venture Capital; Brokerage; Ratings and Ratings Agencies
Compensation Packages; Payment Methods
Thema
Financial institutions
Labour markets

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Allen, Jason
Thompson, James R.
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Bank of Canada
(wo)
Ottawa
(wann)
2016

DOI
doi:10.34989/swp-2016-12
Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
20.09.2024, 08:23 MESZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Allen, Jason
  • Thompson, James R.
  • Bank of Canada

Entstanden

  • 2016

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