Arbeitspapier
Sabotaging potential rivals
This paper studies sabotage in a contest with non-identical players. Unlike previous papers, we consider sabotage in an elimination contest and allow contestants to sabotage a potential or future rival. It turns out that for a certain partition of players there is a pure-strategy equilibrium in which only the most able contestant engages in sabotage while less able contestants do not. The most able contestant may therefore prefer a situation where sabotage is allowed to one where sabotage is not allowed. For another partition of players, there is a unique equilibrium in which none of the players invests in sabotage.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 1500
Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
Thema
all-pay auction
elimination contests
potential rival
sabotage
Wirtschaftskriminalität
Wettbewerb
Auktionstheorie
Spieltheorie
elimination contests
potential rival
sabotage
Wirtschaftskriminalität
Wettbewerb
Auktionstheorie
Spieltheorie
Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Amegashie, J. Atsu
Runkel, Marco
Runkel, Marco
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
(wo)
Munich
(wann)
2005
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
12.07.2024, 13:22 MESZ
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Amegashie, J. Atsu
- Runkel, Marco
- Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
Entstanden
- 2005
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