Arbeitspapier
Sabotaging potential rivals
This paper studies sabotage in a contest with non-identical players. Unlike previous papers, we consider sabotage in an elimination contest and allow contestants to sabotage a potential or future rival. It turns out that for a certain partition of players there is a pure-strategy equilibrium in which only the most able contestant engages in sabotage while less able contestants do not. The most able contestant may therefore prefer a situation where sabotage is allowed to one where sabotage is not allowed. For another partition of players, there is a unique equilibrium in which none of the players invests in sabotage.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 1500
Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
elimination contests
potential rival
sabotage
Wirtschaftskriminalität
Wettbewerb
Auktionstheorie
Spieltheorie
Runkel, Marco
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
12.07.2024, 13:22 MESZ
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Amegashie, J. Atsu
- Runkel, Marco
- Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
Entstanden
- 2005