Sabotage in Asymmetric Contests – An Experimental Analysis

Arbeitspapier

In a contest players compete for winning a prize by effort and thereby increasing their probability of winning. Contestants, however, could also improve their own relative position by harming the other players. We experimentally analyze contests with heterogeneous agents who may individually sabotage each other. Our results suggest that sabotaging behavior systematically varies with the composition of different types of agents in a contest. Moreover, if the saboteur's identity is revealed sabotage decreases while retaliation motives prevail.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: Bonn Econ Discussion Papers ; No. 12/2004

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Individual ; Noncooperative Games ; Compensation Packages; Payment Methods ; Labor Contracts
• Thema: Contest ; Experiments ; Sabotage ; Tournament ; Wettbewerb ; Experiment ; Nichtkooperatives Spiel ; Theorie ; Tournament

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Kräkel, Matthias ; Irlenbusch, Bernd ; Harbring, Christine ; Selten, Reinhard
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): University of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE)
• (wo): Bonn
• (wann): 2004

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/22890
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 12.07.2024, 13:24 MESZ