Arbeitspapier
Sabotage in Asymmetric Contests – An Experimental Analysis
In a contest players compete for winning a prize by effort and thereby increasing their probability of winning. Contestants, however, could also improve their own relative position by harming the other players. We experimentally analyze contests with heterogeneous agents who may individually sabotage each other. Our results suggest that sabotaging behavior systematically varies with the composition of different types of agents in a contest. Moreover, if the saboteur's identity is revealed sabotage decreases while retaliation motives prevail.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Bonn Econ Discussion Papers ; No. 12/2004
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Individual
Noncooperative Games
Compensation Packages; Payment Methods
Labor Contracts
- Thema
-
Contest
Experiments
Sabotage
Tournament
Wettbewerb
Experiment
Nichtkooperatives Spiel
Theorie
Tournament
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Kräkel, Matthias
Irlenbusch, Bernd
Harbring, Christine
Selten, Reinhard
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
University of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE)
- (wo)
-
Bonn
- (wann)
-
2004
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
20.09.2024, 08:22 MESZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Kräkel, Matthias
- Irlenbusch, Bernd
- Harbring, Christine
- Selten, Reinhard
- University of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE)
Entstanden
- 2004
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