Arbeitspapier

Endogenous Timing in Quality Investments and Price Competition

We modify the price-setting version of the vertically differentiated duopoly model by Aoki (2003) by introducing an extended game in which firms noncooperatively choose the timing of moves at the quality stage. Our results show that there are multiple equilibria in pure strategies, in which firms always select sequential play at the quality stage. We also investigate the mixed-strategy equilibrium, revealing that the probability of generating outcomes out of equilibrium is higher than its complement to one. In the alternative of full market coverage, we show that the quality stage is solved in dominant strategies and therefore the choice of roles becomes irrelevant as the Nash and Stackelberg solutions coincide.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Quaderni - Working Paper DSE ; No. 815

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games
Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Lambertini, Luca
Tampieri, Alessandro
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche (DSE)
(wo)
Bologna
(wann)
2012

DOI
doi:10.6092/unibo/amsacta/4201
Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
20.09.2024, 08:21 MESZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Lambertini, Luca
  • Tampieri, Alessandro
  • Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche (DSE)

Entstanden

  • 2012

Ähnliche Objekte (12)