Arbeitspapier

Endogenous move structure and voluntary provision of public goods: Theory and experiments

In this paper we examine voluntary contributions to a public good when the timing of contributions is endogenously determined by contributors, focusing on the simple quasi-linear setting with two players (Varian, 1994). We show that the move order that is predicted to emerge is sensitive to how commitment opportunities are modeled. We show that a favorable move order is predicted to emerge in Hamilton and Slutsky's (1990) observable delay extended game, but a detrimental move order is predicted to emerge in their action commitment extended game. We then report a laboratory experiment designed to examine whether the predicted move ordering emerges, and how this impacts overall contributions, in these extended games. The results are similar in both extended games. We find that when the detrimental move order is observed, contributions are indeed lower, as predicted. However, this detrimental move order is seldom observed. Instead of committing to low contributions, players tend to avoid making a commitment. These experimental results on timing decisions suggest that commitment opportunities may be less damaging to public good provision than previously thought.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: CeDEx Discussion Paper Series ; No. 2009-09

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Public Goods
Noncooperative Games
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Group Behavior
Thema
public goods
voluntary contributions
sequential contributions
endogenous timing
action commitment
observable delay
experiment
Öffentliches Gut
Spende
Spieltheorie
Test

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Nosenzo, Daniele
Sefton, Martin
Possajennikov, Alex
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
The University of Nottingham, Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics (CeDEx)
(wo)
Nottingham
(wann)
2009

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ

Datenpartner

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Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Nosenzo, Daniele
  • Sefton, Martin
  • Possajennikov, Alex
  • The University of Nottingham, Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics (CeDEx)

Entstanden

  • 2009

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