Arbeitspapier

Incentives for Effective Risk Management

Under the new Capital Accord, banks choose between two different types of risk management systems, the standard or the internal rating based approach. The paper considers how a bank's preference for a risk management system is affected by the presence of supervision by bank regulators. The model uses a principal–agent setting between a bank's owner and its risk management. The main conclusion is that previously unregulated institutions can be expected to switch to the lower quality standard approach subsequent to becoming regulated, i.e., the presence of regulation may induce a bank to decrease the quality of its risk management system.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper ; No. 01-094/2

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Banks; Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
Financial Institutions and Services: Government Policy and Regulation
Thema
Risk management systems
Regulation
Value-at-Risk
Basel-II
Risikomanagement
Kreditrisiko
Bankenaufsicht
Basler Akkord

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Daníelsson, Jón
Jorgensen, Bjørn N.
de Vries, Casper G.
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Tinbergen Institute
(wo)
Amsterdam and Rotterdam
(wann)
2001

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
20.09.2024, 08:21 MESZ

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Daníelsson, Jón
  • Jorgensen, Bjørn N.
  • de Vries, Casper G.
  • Tinbergen Institute

Entstanden

  • 2001

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