Arbeitspapier
Incentives for Effective Risk Management
Under the new Capital Accord, banks choose between two different types of risk management systems, the standard or the internal rating based approach. The paper considers how a bank's preference for a risk management system is affected by the presence of supervision by bank regulators. The model uses a principal–agent setting between a bank's owner and its risk management. The main conclusion is that previously unregulated institutions can be expected to switch to the lower quality standard approach subsequent to becoming regulated, i.e., the presence of regulation may induce a bank to decrease the quality of its risk management system.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper ; No. 01-094/2
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Banks; Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
Financial Institutions and Services: Government Policy and Regulation
- Thema
-
Risk management systems
Regulation
Value-at-Risk
Basel-II
Risikomanagement
Kreditrisiko
Bankenaufsicht
Basler Akkord
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Daníelsson, Jón
Jorgensen, Bjørn N.
de Vries, Casper G.
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Tinbergen Institute
- (wo)
-
Amsterdam and Rotterdam
- (wann)
-
2001
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
20.09.2024, 08:21 MESZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Daníelsson, Jón
- Jorgensen, Bjørn N.
- de Vries, Casper G.
- Tinbergen Institute
Entstanden
- 2001
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