Arbeitspapier
Optimal Degree of Public Information Dissemination
Financial markets and macroeconomic environments are often characterized by positive externalities. In these environments, transparency may reduce expected welfare from an ex-ante point of view: public announcements serve as a focal point for higher-order beliefs and affect agents' behaviour more than justified by their informational contents. Some scholars conclude that it might be better to reduce the precision of public signals or entirely withhold information. This paper shows that public information should always be provided with maximum precision, but under certain conditions not to all agents. Restricting the degree of publicity is a better-suited instrument for preventing the negative welfare effects of public announcements than restrictions on their precision are.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: SFB/TR 15 Discussion Paper ; No. 158
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Foreign Exchange
- Thema
-
Transparency
public information
private information
coordination
strategic complementarity
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Cornand, Camille
Heinemann, Frank
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 15 - Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems (GESY)
- (wo)
-
München
- (wann)
-
2006
- DOI
-
doi:10.5282/ubm/epub.13393
- Handle
- URN
-
urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-epub-13393-6
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:41 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Cornand, Camille
- Heinemann, Frank
- Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 15 - Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems (GESY)
Entstanden
- 2006
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