Central bank reputation, cheap talk and transparency as substitutes for commitment: Experimental evidence
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Identifier
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1230468552
- Beteiligte Personen und Organisationen
-
Duffy, John
Heinemann, Frank
- DOI
-
10.14279/depositonce-11694
- URN
- Rechteinformation
-
Der Zugriff auf das Objekt ist unbeschränkt möglich.
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
26.01.2023, 13:55 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
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Beteiligte
- Duffy, John
- Heinemann, Frank
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