Arbeitspapier
Public-good provision in a large economy
We propose a new approach to the normative analysis of public-good provision in a large economy. Our analysis is based on a mechanism design approach that involves a requirement of coalition-proofness, as well as a requirement of robustness, so that the mechanism must not depend on specific assumptions about individual beliefs. Our main result shows that such a mechanism can condition only on the population shares of people with valuations above and below the per capita provision costs. This suggests an intriguing link between mechanism design for large economies and voting.
- Sprache
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Englisch
- Erschienen in
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Series: Preprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods ; No. 2010,02
- Klassifikation
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Wirtschaft
Welfare Economics: General
Analysis of Collective Decision-Making: General
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Public Goods
- Thema
-
Public-good provision
Mechanism Design
Large Economy
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Bierbrauer, Felix
Hellwig, Martin
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods
- (wo)
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Bonn
- (wann)
-
2010
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
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10.03.2025, 11:45 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
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ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Bierbrauer, Felix
- Hellwig, Martin
- Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods
Entstanden
- 2010
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