Incomplete-information games in large populations with anonymity

Arbeitspapier

The paper provides mathematical foundations for modeling strategic interdependence with a continuum of agents where uncertainty has an aggregate component and an agent-specific component and the latter satisfies a conditional law of large numbers. This decomposition of uncertainty is implied by a condition of anonymity in beliefs, under which the agent in question considers the other agents’ types to be essentially pairwise exchangeable. If there is also anonymity in payoff functions, all strategically relevant aspects of beliefs are contained in an agent’s macro beliefs about the cross-section distribution of the other agents’types. The paper also gives conditions under which a function assigning macro beliefs to types is compatible with the existence of a common prior.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: Discussion Papers of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods ; No. 2019/14

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Game Theory and Bargaining Theory: General ; Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design ; Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
• Thema: Incomplete-information games ; large populations ; belief functions ; common priors ; exchangeability ; conditional independence ; conditional exact law of large numbers

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Hellwig, Martin
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods
• (wo): Bonn
• (wann): 2019

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/229986
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 20.09.2024, 08:21 MESZ