Arbeitspapier
Does Information Sharing Reduce the Role of Collateral as a Screening Device?
Information sharing and collateral reduce adverse selection costs, but are costly for lenders. When a bank learns more about the types of its rival's borrowers through information sharing (e.g., credit bureaus), it might seem that this information should substitute the role of collateral in screening their types. We instead show that information sharing may increase, rather than decrease, the role of collateral, which can be required in loans to high-risk borrowers in cases when it is not in the absence of information sharing. We extend to show that ex ante screening can substitute both collateral and information sharing.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- ISBN
-
978-82-7553-707-0
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Working Paper ; No. 2012/19
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Banks; Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
- Thema
-
bank competition
information sharing
collateral
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Karapetyan, Artashes
Stacescu, Bogdan
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Norges Bank
- (wo)
-
Oslo
- (wann)
-
2012
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Karapetyan, Artashes
- Stacescu, Bogdan
- Norges Bank
Entstanden
- 2012
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