Arbeitspapier
Efficiency in Bargaining with Information Externalities
Bargaining is examined for the situation in which each party has private information regarding their valuation of the good as well as the value of the good to the other party. The k-double auction and the first-and-final offer bargaining game are shown not to be ex ante incentive efficient. This result contrasts with the independent private values case. A trading process based on priority pricing is shown to implement the ex ante incentive efficient mechanism.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Discussion Paper ; No. 941R
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Spulber, Daniel F.
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Northwestern University, Kellogg School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science
- (wo)
-
Evanston, IL
- (wann)
-
1991
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:41 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Spulber, Daniel F.
- Northwestern University, Kellogg School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science
Entstanden
- 1991
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