Arbeitspapier
Efficiency in Bargaining with Information Externalities
Bargaining is examined for the situation in which each party has private information regarding their valuation of the good as well as the value of the good to the other party. The k-double auction and the first-and-final offer bargaining game are shown not to be ex ante incentive efficient. This result contrasts with the independent private values case. A trading process based on priority pricing is shown to implement the ex ante incentive efficient mechanism.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
-
Series: Discussion Paper ; No. 941R
- Classification
-
Wirtschaft
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- Event
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
-
Spulber, Daniel F.
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Northwestern University, Kellogg School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science
- (where)
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Evanston, IL
- (when)
-
1991
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:41 AM CET
Data provider
This object is provided by:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Spulber, Daniel F.
- Northwestern University, Kellogg School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science
Time of origin
- 1991
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