Contract and game theory: Basic concepts for settings with finite horizons

Artikel

This paper examines a general model of contract in multi-period settings with both external and self-enforcement. In the model, players alternately engage in contract negotiation and take individual actions. A notion of contractual equilibrium, which combines a bargaining solution and individual incentive constraints, is proposed and analyzed. The modeling framework helps identify the relation between the manner in which players negotiate and the outcome of the long-term contractual relationship. In particular, the model shows the importance of accounting for the self-enforced component of contract in the negotiation process. Examples and guidance for applications are provided, along with existence results and a result on a monotone relation between 'activeness of contracting' and contractual equilibrium values.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Journal: Games ; ISSN: 2073-4336 ; Volume: 4 ; Year: 2013 ; Issue: 3 ; Pages: 457-496 ; Basel: MDPI

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft
• Thema: external enforcement ; self-enforcement ; negotiation ; agreements ; contractual equilibrium

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Watson, Joel
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): MDPI
• (wo): Basel
• (wann): 2013

Weitere Informationen

• DOI: doi:10.3390/g4030457
• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/98574
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 20.09.2024, 08:20 MESZ