Arbeitspapier

Equilibrium Unemployment with Credit and Labour Market Imperfections

We study the role of labour and credit market imperfections for the determination of equilibrium unemployment. In the credit market loan contracts are negotiated between financiers and firms, both possessing bargaining power, while the firms and organized labour bargain over the base wage. The sequential labour and credit market negotiations are assumed to take place conditional on the firm having committed itself to use performance-related profit sharing in addition to the negotiated base wage. It is shown that in the presence of profit sharing intensified credit market competition will raise equilibrium unemployment, because it induces wage-enhancing effects causing an increase in the outside option available to union members. Equilibrium unemployment is also an increasing function of firms' bankruptcy risks. It is, however, independent of the degree credit market imperfections if the compensation system is unrelated to firms' profits or if there is a monopoly union in the labour market.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 419

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Thema
Wage and loan bargaining
compensation systems
equilibrium unemployment

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Koskela, Erkki
Stenbacka, Rune
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
(wo)
Munich
(wann)
2001

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
20.09.2024, 08:22 MESZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Koskela, Erkki
  • Stenbacka, Rune
  • Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)

Entstanden

  • 2001

Ähnliche Objekte (12)