Hypothesis testing equilibrium in signaling games

Arbeitspapier

In this paper, we propose a definition of Hypothesis Testing Equilibrium (HTE) for general signaling games with non-Bayesian players nested by an updating rule according to Hypothesis Testing model characterized by Ortoleva (2012). An HTE may be different from a sequential Nash equilibrium because of the dynamic inconsistency. However, when player 2 only takes zero-probability message as an unexpected news, an HTE is a refinement of sequential Nash equilibrium and it survives Intuitive Criterion, but not vice versa. We provide existence theorem covering a broad class of signaling games often studied in economics, and the constrained HTE is unique in such signaling games.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers ; No. 557

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft
• Subject: Signaling Games ; Hypothesis Testing Equilibrium ; Equilibrium Refinement

Contributors, Location and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Sun, Lan
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Bielefeld University, Center for Mathematical Economics (IMW)
• (where): Bielefeld
• (when): 2016

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/149014
• URN: urn:nbn:de:0070-pub-29035369
• Last update: 20.09.2024, 8:25 AM CEST