Arbeitspapier
Pollution permits, strategic trading and dynamic technology adoption
This paper analyzes the dynamic incentives for technology adoption under a transferable permits system, which allows for strategic trading on the permit market. Initially, firms can both invest in low-emitting production technologies and trade permits. In the model, technology adoption and allowance prices are generated endogenously and are inter-dependent. It is shown that the non-cooperative permit trading game possesses a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium, where the allowance value reflects the level of uncovered pollution (demand), the level of unused allowances (supply), and the technological status. These conditions are also satisfied when a price support instrument (dubbed European-cash-for-permits), which is contingent on the adoption of the new technology, is introduced. Numerical investigation confirms that this policy generates a floating price floor for the allowances, and it restores the dynamic incentives to invest. Given that this policy comes at a cost, a criterion for the selection of a self-financing policy (based on convex risk measures) is proposed and implemented.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: SFB 649 Discussion Paper ; No. 2011-042
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
- Subject
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dynamic regulation
emission permits
environment
self-financing policy
technology adoption
Emissionsrechte
Emissionshandel
Umweltschutzinvestition
Technologiewahl
Nichtkooperatives Spiel
Theorie
- Event
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Moreno-Bromberg, Santiago
Taschini, Luca
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Humboldt University of Berlin, Collaborative Research Center 649 - Economic Risk
- (where)
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Berlin
- (when)
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2011
- Handle
- Last update
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10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET
Data provider
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Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Moreno-Bromberg, Santiago
- Taschini, Luca
- Humboldt University of Berlin, Collaborative Research Center 649 - Economic Risk
Time of origin
- 2011