Informational opacity and honest certification

Arbeitspapier

This paper studies the interaction of information disclosure and reputational concerns in certification markets. We argue that by revealing less precise information a certifier reduces the threat of capture. Opaque disclosure rules may reduce profits but also constrain feasible bribes. For large discount factors a certifier is unconstrained in the choice of a disclosure rule and full disclosure maximizes profits. For intermediate discount factors, only less precise, such as noisy, disclosure rules are implementable. Our results suggest that contrary to the common view, coarse disclosure may be socially desirable. A ban may provoke market failure especially in industries where certifier reputational rents are low.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: DIW Discussion Papers ; No. 1291

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Information and Product Quality; Standardization and Compatibility ; Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design ; Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation; Networks ; Production, Pricing, and Market Structure; Size Distribution of Firms
• Thema: Certification ; Bribery ; Reputation

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Pollrich, Martin ; Wagner, Lilo
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW)
• (wo): Berlin
• (wann): 2013

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/72625
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ