Arbeitspapier
Certification and Market Transparency
We provide elementary insights into the effectiveness of certification to increase market transparency. In a market with opaque product quality, sellers use certification as a signaling device, while buyers use it as an inspection device. This difference alone implies that seller-certification yields more transparency and higher social welfare. Under buyer-certification profit maximizing certifiers further limit transparency, but because seller-certification yields larger profits, active regulation concerning the mode of certification is not needed. These findings are robust and widely applicable to, for instance, patents, automotive parts, and financial products.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Working Paper Series ; No. 14-26
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Investment Banking; Venture Capital; Brokerage; Ratings and Ratings Agencies
Information and Product Quality; Standardization and Compatibility
- Thema
-
Market Transparency
Certification
Information and Product Quality
Asymmetric Information
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Stahl, Konrad
Strausz, Roland
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
University of Mannheim, Department of Economics
- (wo)
-
Mannheim
- (wann)
-
2014
- Handle
- URN
-
urn:nbn:de:bsz:180-madoc-372764
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
20.09.2024, 08:21 MESZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Stahl, Konrad
- Strausz, Roland
- University of Mannheim, Department of Economics
Entstanden
- 2014
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