Arbeitspapier
Targeting the wrong teachers? Linking measurement with theory to evaluate teacher incentive schemes
Measurement is crucial to the implementation of output-based incentive schemes. This paper uses models to study the performance of teacher quality estimators that enter teacher incentive schemes. I model an administrator tasked with (i) categorizing teachers with respect to a cutoff, (ii) retaining teachers in a hidden type environment, and (iii) compensating teachers in a hidden action environment. The preferred estimator would be the same in each model and depends on the relationship between teacher quality and class size. I use data from Los Angeles to show that simple fixed effects would almost always outperform more popular empirical Bayes.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: CHCP Working Paper ; No. 2017-1
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
- Thema
-
teacher incentive pay
teacher quality
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Mehta, Nirav
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
The University of Western Ontario, Centre for Human Capital and Productivity (CHCP)
- (wo)
-
London (Ontario)
- (wann)
-
2017
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Mehta, Nirav
- The University of Western Ontario, Centre for Human Capital and Productivity (CHCP)
Entstanden
- 2017
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