Arbeitspapier

The Effect of Rating Agencies on Herd Behaviour

This paper purports to provide some evidence on the effect of rating agencies on herding in financial markets. By means of a laboratory experiment, we investigate the effect and interaction between private and public information. Previous experiments showed that lemmings behaviour can survive in a market context where information is private (Hey and Morone, 2004), and that an experimental market can be very volatile and not efficient in transmitting information (Alfarano et al., 2006). We study experimentally, if socially undesirable behaviour – that survives in a market contest – may be eliminated owing to the presence of rating agencies.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: EERI Research Paper Series ; No. 21/2008

Classification
Wirtschaft
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Individual
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
Subject
Herd behaviour
informational cascades
rating agency
bubble

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Ferri, Giovanni
Morone, Andrea
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Economics and Econometrics Research Institute (EERI)
(where)
Brussels
(when)
2008

Handle
Last update
20.09.2024, 8:22 AM CEST

Data provider

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ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.

Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Ferri, Giovanni
  • Morone, Andrea
  • Economics and Econometrics Research Institute (EERI)

Time of origin

  • 2008

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