Arbeitspapier

Non-cooperative and cooperative policy reforms under uncertainty and spillovers

When countries need to implement costly economic policy reforms, these often imply uncertainties about their effectiveness for the home country and their spillovers to other countries. We develop a model to show that under these circumstances countries implement too few or too many policy reforms. From a social perspective, too many reforms follow if the spillover effects of reforms become sufficiently uncertain. Since centralization of policies to correct inefficient policies is often not possible, we look for alternative instruments that can restore the efficient level of reforms. We compare subsidizing reform e orts with insuring against bad outcomes, and argue that subsidies are advantageous in terms of requiring less information for implementation.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: MAGKS Joint Discussion Paper Series in Economics ; No. 07-2017

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
International Institutional Arrangements
State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations: General
Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights: General
Thema
policy reforms
spillovers
policy uncertainty
free-riding
subsidy
insurance

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Hefeker, Carsten
Neugart, Michael
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Philipps-University Marburg, School of Business and Economics
(wo)
Marburg
(wann)
2017

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
20.09.2024, 08:23 MESZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Hefeker, Carsten
  • Neugart, Michael
  • Philipps-University Marburg, School of Business and Economics

Entstanden

  • 2017

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