Arbeitspapier
Dynamic consistency in incomplete information games with multiple priors
This paper generalizes the concept of Sequential Equilibrium to allow for ambiguous incomplete information about types or states. We characterize conditions that ensure existence of Sequential Equilibria under ambiguous incomplete information. Under these conditions players form subjective prior belief sets that satisfy a rectangularity condition which leads to dynamically consistent behavior. Furthermore, we give an example which shows that ambiguity can introduce new Sequential Equilibria.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers ; No. 599
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games
Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
- Thema
-
sequential equilibrium
ambiguity
dynamic consistency
multiple priors
imprecise information
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Pahlke, Marieke
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Bielefeld University, Center for Mathematical Economics (IMW)
- (wo)
-
Bielefeld
- (wann)
-
2018
- Handle
- URN
-
urn:nbn:de:0070-pub-29304923
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Pahlke, Marieke
- Bielefeld University, Center for Mathematical Economics (IMW)
Entstanden
- 2018
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