Artikel
Many-to-many matching and price discrimination
We study centralized many-to-many matching in markets where agents have private information about (vertical) characteristics that determine match values. Our analysis reveals how matching patterns reflect cross-subsidization between sides. Agents are endogenously partitioned into consumers and inputs. At the optimum, the costs of procuring agents-inputs are compensated by the gains from agents-consumers. We show how such cross-subsidization can be achieved through matching rules that have a simple threshold structure, and deliver testable predictions relating the optimal price schedules to the distribution of the agents' characteristics. The analysis sheds light on the practice of large matching intermediaries, such as media and business-to-business platforms, advertising exchanges, and commercial lobbying firms.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Journal: Theoretical Economics ; ISSN: 1555-7561 ; Volume: 11 ; Year: 2016 ; Issue: 3 ; Pages: 1005-1052 ; New Haven, CT: The Econometric Society
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- Thema
-
Vertical matching markets
many-to-many matching
asymmetric information
mechanism design
cross-subsidization
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Gomes, Renato
Pavan, Alessandro
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
The Econometric Society
- (wo)
-
New Haven, CT
- (wann)
-
2016
- DOI
-
doi:10.3982/TE1904
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
20.09.2024, 08:22 MESZ
Datenpartner
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Artikel
Beteiligte
- Gomes, Renato
- Pavan, Alessandro
- The Econometric Society
Entstanden
- 2016
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