Arbeitspapier

Asymmetric obligations

We use a laboratory experiment to investigate the behavioral effects of obligations that are not backed by binding deterrent incentives. To implement such 'expressive law' we introduce different levels of very weakly incentivized, symmetric and asymmetric minimum contribution levels (obligations) in a repeated public goods experiment. The results provide evidence for a weak expressive function of law: while the initial impact of high obligations on behavior is strong, it decreases over time. Asymmetric obligations are as effective as symmetric ones. Our results are compatible with the argument that expressive law affects behavior by attaching an emotional cost of disobeying the own obligation.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 3450

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Group Behavior
Public Goods
Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior: General
Thema
non-binding obligations
expressive law
public goods
experiment
Soziale Norm
Normbefolgung
Öffentliches Gut
Wiederholte Spiele
Test

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Riedel, Nadine
Schildberg-Hörisch, Hannah
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
(wo)
Munich
(wann)
2011

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ

Datenpartner

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Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Riedel, Nadine
  • Schildberg-Hörisch, Hannah
  • Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)

Entstanden

  • 2011

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