Arbeitspapier
Crowdfunding, demand uncertainty, and moral hazard: A mechanism design approach
Crowdfunding challenges the traditional separation between finance and marketing. It creates economic value by reducing demand uncertainty, which enables a better screening of positive NPV projects. Entrepreneurial moral hazard threatens this effect. Using mechanism design, mechanisms are characterized that induce efficient screening, while preventing moral hazard. "All-or-nothing" reward-crowdfunding platforms reflect salient features of these mechanisms. Efficiency is sustainable only if expected gross returns exceed twice expected investment costs. Constrained efficient mechanisms exhibit underinvestment. With limited consumer reach, crowdfunders become actual investors. Crowdfunding complements rather than substitutes traditional entrepreneurial financing, because each financing mode displays a different strength.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: SFB 649 Discussion Paper ; No. 2015-036
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
Production, Pricing, and Market Structure; Size Distribution of Firms
Marketing
- Thema
-
crowdfunding
finance
marketing
demand uncertainty
moral hazard
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Strausz, Roland
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Humboldt University of Berlin, Collaborative Research Center 649 - Economic Risk
- (wo)
-
Berlin
- (wann)
-
2015
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
20.09.2024, 08:24 MESZ
Datenpartner
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Strausz, Roland
- Humboldt University of Berlin, Collaborative Research Center 649 - Economic Risk
Entstanden
- 2015
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