The role of discounting in bargaining with one-sided offers

Arbeitspapier

This paper analyzes a continuous-time Coase setting with finite horizon, interdependent values, and different discount rates. Our full characterization of equilibrium behavior permits studying how patience shapes the bargaining outcome. We obtain that (i) the seller's commitment problem persists even when she is fully patient, (ii) making the seller more impatient may increase equilibrium prices, (iii) when adverse selection is not strong, the buyer is ex-post better off when he is more impatient, and (iv) when discounting is time-dependent, episodes where the seller or the buyer have a high discount rate feature a large probability of trade, but only periods with high buyer discounting lead to a fast price decline.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: ECONtribute Discussion Paper ; No. 063

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory ; Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
• Thema: Bargaining ; one-sided offers ; different discount factors

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Dilmé, Francesc
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): University of Bonn and University of Cologne, Reinhard Selten Institute (RSI)
• (wo): Bonn and Cologne
• (wann): 2021

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/231488
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ