Arbeitspapier
Time-consistent carbon pricing
In this paper we show that carbon pricing is subject to time-inconsistency and we investigate solutions to improve on the problem and restore the incentive for the private sector to invest in low-carbon innovation. We show that a superior price-investment equilibrium can be sustained in the long-term, if the policy-maker is enough forward looking and allowed to build reputation. In the short-term, time-inconsistency can be alleviated by complementing carbon pricing with project-based carbon price guarantees.
- Sprache
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Englisch
- Erschienen in
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Series: DIW Discussion Papers ; No. 1710
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games
Economics of Regulation
Innovation and Invention: Processes and Incentives
Environmental Economics: Government Policy
- Thema
-
Carbon pricing
Time-inconsistency
Low-carbon innovation
Environmental regulation
Repeated games
Carbon contracts
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Chiappinelli, Olga
Neuhoff, Karsten
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW)
- (wo)
-
Berlin
- (wann)
-
2017
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
20.09.2024, 08:22 MESZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Chiappinelli, Olga
- Neuhoff, Karsten
- Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW)
Entstanden
- 2017