Arbeitspapier
Funding deposit insurance
We present a quantitative model of deposit insurance. We characterize the policymaker's optimal choices of coverage for depositors and premiums raised from banks. Premiums contribute to a deposit insurance fund that lowers taxpayers' resolution cost of bank failures. We find that riskadjusted premiums reduce moral hazard, enabling the policymaker to increase deposit insurance coverage by 3 percentage points and decrease the share of expected annual bank failures from 0.66% to 0.16%. The model predicts a fund-to-covered-deposits ratio that matches the data and declines in taxpayers' income due to taxpayers' risk aversion.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- ISBN
-
978-92-899-5289-7
- Erschienen in
-
Series: ECB Working Paper ; No. 2704
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Banks; Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
Financial Institutions and Services: Government Policy and Regulation
- Thema
-
Deposit Insurance
Bank Runs
Bank Regulation
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Oosthuizen, Dick
Zalla, Ryan
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
European Central Bank (ECB)
- (wo)
-
Frankfurt a. M.
- (wann)
-
2022
- DOI
-
doi:10.2866/623654
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
20.09.2024, 08:22 MESZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Oosthuizen, Dick
- Zalla, Ryan
- European Central Bank (ECB)
Entstanden
- 2022
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