Arbeitspapier

The Transaction Costs Perspective on Costs And Benefits of Government Regulation

This paper explores the feasibility to extend the Standard Cost Model (SCM) for calculating the costs of government regulation by taking all transaction costs into account which stem from the principal/agent relationship between regulatory authorities and economic entities. From that perspective these transaction costs do not only relate to the bonding costs of the regulated entities – part of these costs can be regarded as the administrative burden of regulation for the private sector – but also to the monitoring costs of the regulators and to the residual loss. These latter costs can be regarded as cost to society due to e.g. miscommunication on the aims of regulation, and are, of course, hard to quantify. A cost calculation using the (extended) SCM presumes that the regulatory rules are given and set autonomously by the regulatory authorities. However, it may be welfare enhancing if regulations are fashioned in such a way that net benefits are optimized. From that perspective the paper looks at the possibility to select optimal regulation by means of a cost benefit analysis. A major argument is that the benefits of regulatory measures, e.g. to internalize external effects, comprise avoiding societal costs associated with no or less regulation.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper ; No. 09-013/3

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
Structure, Scope, and Performance of Government
Public Administration; Public Sector Accounting and Audits
Thema
bonding costs
compliance costs
monitoring costs
welfare effects of government regulation
Folgekosten
Transaktionskosten
Wohlfahrtsanalyse
Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
den Butter, Frank A.G.
de Graaf, Marc
Nijsen, André
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Tinbergen Institute
(wo)
Amsterdam and Rotterdam
(wann)
2009

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
20.09.2024, 08:22 MESZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • den Butter, Frank A.G.
  • de Graaf, Marc
  • Nijsen, André
  • Tinbergen Institute

Entstanden

  • 2009

Ähnliche Objekte (12)