Arbeitspapier

Hobbes to Rousseau : Inequality, Institutions, and Development

We analyze the endogenous evolution of economic and political institutions and the interdependencies with the process of economic development. Favorable economic institutions ensure the appropriability of rents in form of a state of law. We study the conditions under which a state of law can be implemented under oligarchy, and when democratization is necessary. Inequality in endowments and incomes prolongs the absence of good institutions and delays democratization. Conversely, institutions shape the income distribution. Simulations illustrate how inequality affects the development process and may lead to overtaking and divergence. The implications are in line with historical and empirical evidence.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: IZA Discussion Papers ; No. 1450

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Economic History: Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics; Industrial Structure; Growth; Fluctuations: General, International, or Comparative
Development Planning and Policy: General
Structure and Scope of Government: General
Thema
inequality
democratization
institutions
state of law
long-term development
Institutioneller Wandel
Entwicklung
Rechtsstaat
Einkommensverteilung
Demokratisierung
Verfassungsökonomik
Public Choice
Theorie

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Cervellati, Matteo
Fortunato, Piergiuseppe
Sunde, Uwe
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
(wo)
Bonn
(wann)
2005

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:46 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Cervellati, Matteo
  • Fortunato, Piergiuseppe
  • Sunde, Uwe
  • Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)

Entstanden

  • 2005

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