Ignorance is bliss: Voter education and alignment in distributive politics

Arbeitspapier

Central-government politicians channel resources to sub-national entities for political gains. We show formally that the central politicians' allocation decision has two drivers: political alignment (between central and local politicians) and the level of local political accountability. However, drivers count one at a time: alignment matters before local elections, while local political accountability matters before central elections. We then perform a test of our model using Brazilian data, which corroborates our results. Furthermore, we show and explain why political accountability becomes a curse: better-educated districts receive fewer transfers in equilibrium.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: Texto para discussão ; No. 690

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior ; Structure, Scope, and Performance of Government
• Subject: Federalism ; Distributive Politics ; Partisan Alignment ; Voters' Education ; Political Accountability ; Brazil

Contributors, Location and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Boffa, Federico ; Cavalcanti, Francisco ; Piolatto, Amedeo
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Rio de Janeiro (PUC-Rio), Departamento de Economia
• (where): Rio de Janeiro
• (when): 2021

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/249738
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET