Centralized bargaining, multi-tasking and work incentives

Arbeitspapier

The paper examines the implications of an important aspect of the ongoing reorganization of work - the move from occupational specialization toward multi-tasking - for centralized wage bargaining. The analysis shows how, on account of this reorganization, centralized bargaining becomes increasingly inefficient and detrimental to firms’ profit opportunities, since it prevents firms from offering their employees adequate incentives to perform the appropriate mix of tasks. The paper also shows how centralized bargaining inhibits firms from using wages to induce workers to learn how to use their experience from one set of tasks to enhance their performance at other tasks. In this way, the paper helps explain the increasing resistance to centralized bargaining in various advanced market economies.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: Seminar paper ; No. 620

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft
• Subject: centralized wage bargaining ; restructuring ; technological change ; information flows ; employment ; wage formation ; unemployment ; organization of firms

Contributors, Location and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Lindbeck, Assar ; Snower, Dennis J.
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Institute for International Economic Studies
• (where): Stockholm
• (when): 1996

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/961
• URN: urn:nbn:se:su:diva-41953
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET