Arbeitspapier

Distortionary fiscal policy and monetary policy goals

We reconsider the role of an inflation conservative central banker in a setting with distortionary taxation. To do so, we assume monetary and fiscal policy are decided by independent authorities that do not abide to past commitments. If the two authorities make policy decisions simultaneously, inflation conservatism causes fiscal overspending. But if fiscal policy is determined before monetary policy, inflation conservatism imposes fiscal discipline. These results clarify that in our setting the value of inflation conservatism depends crucially on the timing of policy decisions.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Sveriges Riksbank Working Paper Series ; No. 278

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Monetary Policy
Fiscal Policy
Comparative or Joint Analysis of Fiscal and Monetary Policy; Stabilization; Treasury Policy
Thema
optimal policy
lack of commitment
conservative monetary policy

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Adam, Klaus
Billi, Roberto M.
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Sveriges Riksbank
(wo)
Stockholm
(wann)
2013

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:41 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Adam, Klaus
  • Billi, Roberto M.
  • Sveriges Riksbank

Entstanden

  • 2013

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