Arbeitspapier

Voluntary approaches and the organisation of environmental R&D

We consider a setting where firms undertake emission-reducing R&D and the regulator, who sets the emission tax, is unable to commit credibly. Firms are subject to research spillovers in emission reduction. We examine two regimes with respect to the organization of R&D: independent R&D and an environmental R&D cartel (ERC). Environmental R&D is higher in the ERC compared to independent R&D for small damages and also for large damages when R&D is efficient. In contrast, when damages are large and R&D is inefficient the opposite is true. The same ranking applies to the comparison of social welfare.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Nota di Lavoro ; No. 74. 2000

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Management of Technological Innovation and R&D
Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
Renewable Resources and Conservation: Government Policy
Thema
Environmental R&D Cartels
Environmental Research Joint Venture
Cooperative R&D
Emission Tax
Industrielle Forschung
Umwelttechnik
Ökosteuer
Selbstverpflichtung
Forschungskooperation
Theorie

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Poyago-Theotoky, Joanna
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)
(wo)
Milano
(wann)
2000

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:41 MEZ

Datenpartner

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Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Poyago-Theotoky, Joanna
  • Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)

Entstanden

  • 2000

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