Arbeitspapier

Status-Seeking in Violent Subcultures and the Double Dividend of Zero-Tolerance

This paper develops a model in which individuals gain social status among their peers for being 'tough' by committing violent acts. We show that a high penalty for moderately violent acts (zero-tolerance) may yield a double dividend in that it reduces both moderate and extreme violence. The reason is that a high penalty keeps relatively 'gutless' individuals from committing moderately violent acts, which raises the signaling value of that action, and thus makes it more attractive for otherwise extremely violent individuals. Conversely, a high penalty for extremely violent acts may backfire, as it induces relatively 'tough' individuals to commit moderately violent acts and so makes moderate violence more attractive for otherwise nonviolent individuals.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper ; No. 06-005/1

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Criminal Law
Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
Thema
status concerns
violence
subcultures
penalties
zero-tolerance
broken windows policing
Gewalt
Sozialer Status
Strafe
Kriminalität
Kriminalitätsökonomik
Rechtsdurchsetzung
Doppelte Dividende
Theorie

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Dur, Robert
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Tinbergen Institute
(wo)
Amsterdam and Rotterdam
(wann)
2006

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
20.09.2024, 08:22 MESZ

Datenpartner

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Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Dur, Robert
  • Tinbergen Institute

Entstanden

  • 2006

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