Arbeitspapier
Equilibrium Existence in Incomplete Information Games with Atomic Posteriors
We prove an existence result for games with incomplete information with continuous type spaces under the assumption that players have atomic posteriors. This information structure is an extreme example of the failure of absolute continuity of information, hence our result complements the classical result of Milgrom and Weber (1985).
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Discussion Paper ; No. 1262
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Al-Najjar, Nabil
Solan, Eilon
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Northwestern University, Kellogg School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science
- (wo)
-
Evanston, IL
- (wann)
-
1999
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
20.09.2024, 08:21 MESZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Al-Najjar, Nabil
- Solan, Eilon
- Northwestern University, Kellogg School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science
Entstanden
- 1999
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