Arbeitspapier
Weak and Strong Merging of Opinions
We study merging, in a few senses, of two measures when increasing sequence of information is observed. Motivating this extension of Blackwell and Dubins' (1962) work, are studies of convergence to equilibrium in infinite games and in dynamic economies.
- Language
-
Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
-
Series: Discussion Paper ; No. 983
- Classification
-
Wirtschaft
- Event
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
-
Kalai, Ehud
Lehrer, Ehud
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
-
Northwestern University, Kellogg School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science
- (where)
-
Evanston, IL
- (when)
-
1992
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET
Data provider
This object is provided by:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Kalai, Ehud
- Lehrer, Ehud
- Northwestern University, Kellogg School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science
Time of origin
- 1992
Other Objects (12)
Calibrated Forecasting and Merging
Merging Economic Forecasts
Proportional Solutions to Bargaining Situations: Interpersonal Utility Comparisons
Partially-specified large games
Games in coalitional form
A Game of Barter with Barriers to Trade
Structural robustness of large games
A Group Incentive Compatible Mechanism Yielding Core Allocation
Private Information in Large Games
Ex-Post Stability in Large Games
Preplay Negotiations in Non-Cooperative Games
Solutions to the Bargaining Problem
Calibrated Forecasting and Merging
Merging Economic Forecasts
Proportional Solutions to Bargaining Situations: Interpersonal Utility Comparisons
Partially-specified large games
Games in coalitional form
A Game of Barter with Barriers to Trade
Structural robustness of large games
A Group Incentive Compatible Mechanism Yielding Core Allocation
Private Information in Large Games
Ex-Post Stability in Large Games
Preplay Negotiations in Non-Cooperative Games
Solutions to the Bargaining Problem
Calibrated Forecasting and Merging
Merging Economic Forecasts
Proportional Solutions to Bargaining Situations: Interpersonal Utility Comparisons
Partially-specified large games
Games in coalitional form
A Game of Barter with Barriers to Trade
Structural robustness of large games
A Group Incentive Compatible Mechanism Yielding Core Allocation
Private Information in Large Games
Ex-Post Stability in Large Games
Preplay Negotiations in Non-Cooperative Games