Arbeitspapier

The Signaling Role of Corporate Social Responsibility

We examine the role of CSR as a mechanism for private provision of public goods. We argue that corporations are using CSR to signal high product quality and demonstrate that signaling gives rise to an excessive level of contributions that offsets the positive externality, which causes the under-provision of public goods. We analyze the tax policy implications of such assertion. Accounting for this offset would call for a decrease in (and potentially elimination of) the subsidy offered to corporations engaged in CSR activities.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 4962

Classification
Wirtschaft
Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue: General
Publicly Provided Goods: General
Other Substantive Areas of Law: General
Subject
signaling
corporate social responsibility
public goods
Pigouvian taxation

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Blumkin, Tomer
Margalioth, Yoram
Sharoni, Adi
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
(where)
Munich
(when)
2014

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Blumkin, Tomer
  • Margalioth, Yoram
  • Sharoni, Adi
  • Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)

Time of origin

  • 2014

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