Arbeitspapier

Linked games, international organisations and agricultural trade

Over the past decade, most OECD countries have begun to reform fundamentally their agricultural policies. Some dispute has emerged over the extent to which policy-making at the international level has triggered these reforms. These disputes raise important theoretical questions about how we theorize and test for the degree of interdependence between international, regional (EU), and domestic policy change. This paper offers the concept of autonomous, linked games as a possible theoretical route to follow, a route that also permits more systematic theoretical consideration of the role of international organizations in policy-making. We focus, in particular, on the European Commission and the GATT Secretariat. Drawing on these concepts, we argue that policy reform by EU member states was significantly shaped by proposals and outcomes in the international negotiations on agriculture during the GATT Uruguay Round.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: MPIfG Discussion Paper ; No. 98/8

Klassifikation
Sozialwissenschaften, Soziologie, Anthropologie
Thema
Weltwirtschaftspolitik
Internationale Handelspolitik
Spieltheorie
Agraraußenhandel
Außenhandelspolitik
EU-Agrarpolitik
Welt
EU-Staaten

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Coleman, William D.
Tangermann, Stefan
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Max-Planck-Institut für Gesellschaftsforschung
(wo)
Köln
(wann)
1998

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
20.09.2024, 08:20 MESZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Coleman, William D.
  • Tangermann, Stefan
  • Max-Planck-Institut für Gesellschaftsforschung

Entstanden

  • 1998

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