Arbeitspapier
Monitoring and Pay: An Experiment on Employee Performance under Endogenous Supervision
We present an experimental test of a shirking model where monitoring intensity is endogenous and effort a continuous variable. Wage level, monitoring intensity and consequently the desired enforceable effort level are jointly determined by the maximization problem of the firm. As a result, monitoring and pay should be complements. In our experiment, between and within treatment variation is qualitatively in line with the normative predictions of the model under selfishness assumptions. Yet, we also find evidence for reciprocal behavior. The data analysis shows, however, that it does not pay for the employer to rely on the reciprocity of employees.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper ; No. 06-098/1
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Individual
Wage Level and Structure; Wage Differentials
Labor Contracts
- Thema
-
incentive contracts
supervision
efficiency wages
experiment
incomplete contracts
reciprocity
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Dittrich, Dennis
Kocher, Martin G.
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Tinbergen Institute
- (wo)
-
Amsterdam and Rotterdam
- (wann)
-
2006
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
20.09.2024, 08:21 MESZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Dittrich, Dennis
- Kocher, Martin G.
- Tinbergen Institute
Entstanden
- 2006
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