Arbeitspapier
Optimal Information Revelation by Informed Investors
This paper studies the structure of optimal finance contracts in an agency model of outside finance, when investors possess private information. We show that, depending on the intensity of the entrepreneur's moral hazard problem, optimal contracts induce full, partial, or no revelation of the investor's private information. A partial or nonrevelation of information is optimal, when it mitigates an undersupply of effort by the entrepreneur due to moral hazard.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: SFB/TR 15 Discussion Paper ; No. 34
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Investment Banking; Venture Capital; Brokerage; Ratings and Ratings Agencies
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- Thema
-
informed investors
optimal finance contracts
partial information revelation
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Strausz, Roland
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 15 - Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems (GESY)
- (wo)
-
München
- (wann)
-
2005
- DOI
-
doi:10.5282/ubm/epub.13514
- Handle
- URN
-
urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-epub-13514-4
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Strausz, Roland
- Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 15 - Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems (GESY)
Entstanden
- 2005
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