Maximum-revenue tariffs versus free trade

Arbeitspapier

Welfare with the maximum-revenue tariff is compared to free-trade welfare under perfect competition in the case of a large country able to affect its terms of trade; under Cournot duopoly with differentiated products; and under Bertrand duopoly with differentiated products. Under perfect competition, assuming linear demand and supply, welfare with the maximum-revenue tariff will be higher than free-trade welfare if the country has sufficient market power. Under Cournot duopoly and Bertrand duopoly, assuming linear demands and constant marginal costs, welfare with the maximum-revenue tariff is always higher than free-trade welfare.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: Cardiff Economics Working Papers ; No. E2018/8

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Neoclassical Models of Trade ; Models of Trade with Imperfect Competition and Scale Economies; Fragmentation ; Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations
• Subject: Maximum-Revenue Tariff ; Free Trade ; Perfect Competition ; Cournot Oligopoly ; Bertrand Oligopoly

Contributors, Location and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Collie, David R.
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Cardiff University, Cardiff Business School
• (where): Cardiff
• (when): 2018

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/230414
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET