Arbeitspapier
Relational contracts and job design
This paper analyzes the problem of optimal job design when there is only one contractible and imperfect performance measure for all tasks whose contribution to firm value is non-verifiable. I find that task splitting is optimal when relational contracts based on firm value are not feasible. By contrast, if an agent who performs a given set of tasks receives an implicit bonus, the principal always benefits from assigning an additional task to this agent.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: SFB 649 Discussion Paper ; No. 2005,052
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Personnel Economics: Firm Employment Decisions; Promotions
Personnel Economics: Labor Management
- Thema
-
job design
multi-tasking
relational contracts
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Schöttner, Anja
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Humboldt University of Berlin, Collaborative Research Center 649 - Economic Risk
- (wo)
-
Berlin
- (wann)
-
2005
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Schöttner, Anja
- Humboldt University of Berlin, Collaborative Research Center 649 - Economic Risk
Entstanden
- 2005
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