Fixed-prize tournaments versus first-price auctions in innovation contests

Arbeitspapier

This paper analyzes a procurement setting with two identical firms and stochastic innovations. In contrast to the previous literature, I show that a procurer who cannot charge entry fees may prefer a fixed-prize tournament to a first-price auction since holding an auction may leave higher rents to firms when the innovation technology is subject to large random factors.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: SFB 649 Discussion Paper ; No. 2005,041

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Auctions ; National Government Expenditures and Related Policies: Procurement ; Information and Product Quality; Standardization and Compatibility
• Thema: innovation contest ; auction ; tournament ; quality

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Schöttner, Anja
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Humboldt University of Berlin, Collaborative Research Center 649 - Economic Risk
• (wo): Berlin
• (wann): 2005

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/25050
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 12.07.2024, 13:20 MESZ