Arbeitspapier

Liquidity Management and Central Bank Strength: Bank of England Operations Reloaded, 1889-1910

Is a strong commitment to monetary stability enough to ensure credibility? The recent literature suggests it might not be if the central bank cannot perform pure interest rate policy and has to resort to balance sheet policy: the central bank's financial strength (i.e. the long-term sustainability of its policy) is also a determinant of credibility. This paper provides historical evidence on the issue by focusing on the case of the Bank of England at the heyday of the classical gold standard. It shows that as the Bank was not perceived as having the means to fulfil all of its obligations, the efficacy of its interest rate policy was poor. Failing to reform for political economy reasons, the Bank eventually had to default on its formal convertibility mandate.

Sprache
Englisch
ISBN
978-82-7553-927-2

Erschienen in
Series: Working Paper ; No. 10/2016

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Monetary Systems; Standards; Regimes; Government and the Monetary System; Payment Systems
Interest Rates: Determination, Term Structure, and Effects
Central Banks and Their Policies
Economic History: Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics; Industrial Structure; Growth; Fluctuations: Europe: Pre-1913
Thema
central banking
institutional design
monetary policy implementation
reverse repos
term structure of interest rates
gold standard

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Ugolini, Stefano
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Norges Bank
(wo)
Oslo
(wann)
2016

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Ugolini, Stefano
  • Norges Bank

Entstanden

  • 2016

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