Arbeitspapier

Rhetoric in legislative bargaining with asymmetric information

In this paper we analyze a legislative bargaining game in which parties privately informed about their preferences bargain over an ideological and a distributive decision. Communication takes place before a proposal is offered and majority rule voting determines the outcome. When the private information pertains to the ideological intensities but the ideological positions are publicly known, it may not be possible to have informative communication from the legislator who is ideologically distant from the proposer, but the more moderate legislator can communicate whether he would 'compromise' or 'fight' on ideology. If instead the private information pertains to the ideological positions, then all parties may convey whether they will 'cooperate', 'compromise', or 'fight' on ideology. When the uncertainty is about ideological intensity, the proposer is always better on making proposals for the two dimensions together despite separable preferences, but when the uncertainty is about ideological positions, bundling can result in informational loss which hurts the proposer.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Working Paper ; No. 1021

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
Thema
Politische Entscheidung
Parlament
Asymmetrische Information
Abstimmungsregel
Verhandlungstheorie
Public Choice
Theorie

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Chen, Ying
Eraslan, Hülya
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
TÜSİAD-Koç University Economic Research Forum
(wo)
Istanbul
(wann)
2010

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:45 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Chen, Ying
  • Eraslan, Hülya
  • TÜSİAD-Koç University Economic Research Forum

Entstanden

  • 2010

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